维基百科

举证责任 (哲学)

哲學

举证责任（英语：burden of proof）为一哲学方法，源自古典罗马法典（拉丁语：onus probandi）在中立裁判庭前由双方立论并反驳彼此的争讼程序的一项规定，此规定关乎论述之劳务分工[1]：

假设A和B分别代表两种对立观点。如果A取得有利的位置，B将被要求出有力的论点来捍卫自己不太有利的位置，那么是A将举证责任设在B的身上。如果B不能移转举证责任，那么其观点就被击败，即使其观点有可能是正确的。反过来说，如果B提出比A更强的论点，那么B就转移举证责任给A。

举证责任是处理证据的基本原则。一般情况下，主张或反对某事的一方有举证责任。[1]

在过去，举证责任并不是主流哲学的重要概念，因为一般认为一个论点要成功必需要有确凿结论，必需证成而无疑。然而根据概率的理性思考，包括广义的统计思考，提供了可能性结论，虽或有被认为过于主观的问题。[2]

伦理哲学近年来反省考查举证责任在不同机构的移转，是在科学及伦理不确定情境下无法避免的[3]。

知识论争议中一般共识：试图要他人接受一件事的人有义务为那件事提供适当理据。[来源请求]

一般而言，让他人接受自己的主张可得到一定利益，例如名誉、资源等等，因此在公开的思想竞争中，人们认为提出主张的人应提供证据支持其主张，用适当的代价换取可能的利益，避免享利益而不付代价之不对等，如此可确保各思想流派发挥生产力。[4][5][6][7]

举证责任在决定论者身上 编辑

主张非决定论的卡尔·波普尔认为哲学知识的举证责任在决定论者身上，并提出四项理由将举证责任转给决定论者：程度问题、偶然问题、复杂系统预测问题、所有事件皆能料问题[8]。

神学与无神论者关于神是否存在的争论 编辑

参见：天体茶壶

在神学与无神论者关于神是否存在的争论中，无神论的立论之一是采举证责任论点，主张神若存在应由信仰者提供神存在之证据[9]。以举证责任为立论基础的无神论者如安东尼·弗卢(1984)，面临数派神学的批评及挑战[10][11]。

批评 编辑

有数学哲学家认为举证责任做为哲学论证方法没有必要，因为在解决理论问题，而不是法庭上双方争论的裁判问题，举证责任是法律程序，而法庭有时需要在没有资料情况下做出判决。举例来说，一个反对欧几里得的几何学家或许会说举证责任应该在那些说三角形三角总和等于两个直角的人身上，而另一方只需回说那总和肯是极端靠近两个直角，那么举证责任就移到了那些认为不是正好两个直角的人身上[12]。

自然主义 编辑

自然主义哲学立场常使用举证责任来立论，但此立论很少不具争议性，且也建立困难，在哲学上要立基于举证责任是不安稳的[13]。

臆测与主张 编辑

理性上，相信任何事都需要证据，不证自明的事要诉诸最基本的理性直觉，非不证自明的事则要以经验证据作为基础、或由其他已知的事证明或论证作为基础。[来源请求]

理性上来说，如有充分证据显示某事为真，应相信某事为真；如有充分证据显示某事为假，应相信某事为假；如无充分证据显示某事为真、亦无充分证据显示某事为假，应对某事之真假存疑。“不相信某事（为真）”经常用于描述对某事真假存疑的想法，然而有时也指“相信某事为假”，须视具体情况判断。[来源请求]

猜想或臆测（supposition）是依赖彼此的共同信念，只要双方同意即可，双方均不担负举证责任。断定或断言、主张、宣称、声明（assertion）则认定了一件事是真的，一般也相当于要求他人认同，因此须担负举证责任。预设（presumption）则界于两者之间，没有直接的举证责任，但有责任反驳与之冲突的证据。[14]

与无罪推定的关系 编辑

参见：无罪推定和举证责任 (法律)

现代法治国家多半遵守无罪推定原则：“如没有充分证据证明被告有罪，则推定被告无罪”，这么做主要是基于避免冤狱及栽赃等伦理考量，以及“有充分证据证明被告无罪”的现实困难。

一个人事实上有罪但法律上推定无罪是有可能发生的。“法律上推定无罪”只是一种实务上的认定，并不等同于“事实上无罪”，如将无罪推定原则扩大解读为“如没有充分证据证明被告有罪，则事实上被告无罪”，便是不恰当的推理。[15]

注释 编辑

  1. ^ 1.0 1.1 Nicholas Bunnin; Jiyuan Yu. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. 15 April 2008: 92–93. ISBN 978-0-470-99721-5 （英语）. Philosophical method [Latin onus probandi] Originating in classical Roman law, an adversary proceeding where one party tries to establish and another to rebut some charge before a neutral adjudicative tribunal. The term has come to refer to a rule concering the division of labor of argumentation. Suppose A and B represent two competing views. If A has a favorable position, B will be required to produce strong arguments to defend its less favorable position. This is to say, A sets burden of proof on B. If B cannot shift this burden, its positioin is defeated, even though it might be right. On the other hand, if B puts forward arugments that show that its position is stronger than A's, then it transfers the burden of proof to A. It is a basic rule of dealing with evidence. Normally any position that argues for or against something has the burden. For instance, because common sense usually has an intuitive appeal prior to argument, any philosophical position standing against common sense bears the burden of proof. 
  2. ^ Douglas Walton. Burden of Proof, Presumption and Argumentation. Cambridge University Press. 30 June 2014: 122. ISBN 978-1-107-04662-7. Burden of proof did not seem to be an important concept in mainstream philosophy in the past because it was generally assumed that in order for an argument to be successful it has to be a conclusive argument, in some sense meaning that it proves its conclusion beyond doubt. ... Reasoning based on probability, broadly of the statisical kind was reluctantly allowed, but defeasible reasoning of the kind that only offer plausibility of a conclusion was seen as too subjective to be admitted as justification for rational acceptance. The impracticality of this view of the matter has long been implicitly recognized by law, where burden of proof is one of the most important factors in aiding courts to use reasoned argumentation at a conclusion. In typical cases of reasoning based on legal evidence, there is inconsistenncy and uncertainty in the evidence on both sides of a disputed issue, making a conclusive proof for one side an unrealistic requirements. 
  3. ^ Richard H. Gaskins. Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse. Yale University Press. 1992. ISBN 978-0-300-06306-6. 
  4. ^ Goldman, Alvin. Argumentation and Social Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy. 1994, 91 (1): 27–49. JSTOR 2940949. 
  5. ^ Eemeren, Frans van; Grootendorst, Rob. A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004: 60. ISBN 0521830753. [t]here is no point in venturing to resolve a difference of opinion through an argumentative exchange of views if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point. 
  6. ^ Brandom, Robert. Making it Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1994: 222. ISBN 067454319X. [t]here are sentence types that would require a great deal of work for one to get into a position to challenge, such as 'Red is a color,' 'There have been black dogs,' 'Lighting frequently precedes thunder,' and similar commonplaces. These are treated as 'free moves' by members of our speech community—they are available to just about anyone any time to use as premises, to assert unchallenged. 
  7. ^ Adler, Jonathan. Belief’s Own Ethics. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2002: 164–167. ISBN 0262011921. 
  8. ^ Herbert Keuth. The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Cambridge University Press. 2005: 271. ISBN 978-0-521-54830-4. 
  9. ^ atheism. Encyclopaedia Britannica（大英百科全書）. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition （大英线上英文学术版）. 2014. An atheist who argues in this manner may also make a distinctive burden-of-proof argument. Given that God (if there is one) is by definition a very recherché reality—a reality that must be (for there to be such a reality) transcendent to the world—the burden of proof is not on the atheist to give grounds for believing that there is no reality of that order. Rather, the burden of proof is on the believer to give some evidence for God’s existence—i.e., that there is such a reality. Given what God must be, if there is a God, the theist needs to present the evidence, for such a very strange reality. He needs to show that there is more in the world than is disclosed by common experience. The empirical method, and the empirical method alone, such an atheist asserts, affords a reliable method for establishing what is in fact the case. To the claim of the theist that there are in addition to varieties of empirical facts “spiritual facts” or “transcendent facts,” such as it being the case that there is a supernatural, self-existent, eternal power, the atheist can assert that such “facts” have not been shown.  外部链接存在于|= (帮助)
  10. ^ Philosophy of Religion （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  11. ^ Graham Oppy; N. N. Trakakis. Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Religion The History of Western Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. 11 September 2014: 305–. ISBN 978-1-317-54639-9. 
  12. ^ Charles Sanders Peirce; Mouton De Gruyter; Walter De Gruyter Incorporated. Mathematical Philosophy. Walter de Gruyter. 1 January 1976: 73. ISBN 978-3-11-080588-8 （英语）. The burden of proof is strictly an affair of legal procedure, where, owing to the necessity of deciding each case one way or the other, certain rules of presumptions are adopted by courts. there is something analogous in other cases in which questions must be decided, and in which there are some recognized rules for deciding them in the absence of data. But a purely theoretical question need to be decided at all, and therefore, in such a case, there is no "burden of proof." The person who talks of it may mean to say that there is some vague improbability in the proposition he opposes, which may be true. But then he should state his argument just as it really is, so that its true force or weakness may appear. For example, a noneuclidean geometer might say that the burden of proof is upon whoever says that the sum of angels of a triangle is that of two right angles; to which his opponent will answer that it is certainly extremely near that, and that the burden of proof is upon whoever says it is not exactly so. 
  13. ^ J.J. Chambliss. Philosophy of Education An Encyclopedia. Routledge. 4 July 2013: 429. ISBN 978-1-136-51168-4 （英语）. Naturalism... Criticism ...Finally, burden-of-proof claims are rarely uncontroversial, and always difficult to eastablish. It is philosophically precarious to rest one's case on a burden of proof. 
  14. ^ Douglas Walton. Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Routledge. 2013: 17–28. ISBN 113668705X （英语）. 
  15. ^ Dov M. Gabbay; Franz Guenthner. Handbook of Philosophical Logic: Volume 13. Springer. 2006. ISBN 1402035217 （英语）. 

相关概念 编辑

参考资料 编辑

  • Douglas Walton. Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Routledge. 2013. ISBN 113668705X （英语）. 
  • Mojtaba Kazazi. Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on Evidence Before International Tribunals. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1996. ISBN 904110142X （英语）. 

外部链接 编辑

取自“https://zh.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=舉證責任_(哲學)&oldid=80039694”