用户:Park1996/关于2021年9月基金会行动的有关声明
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<translate> 关于最近一系列严重的基金会行动</translate>
编辑<translate> Hello everyone,
大家好,
I’m Maggie Dennis, the Wikimedia Foundation’s Vice President of Community Resilience & Sustainability.[1] I’m reaching out to you today to talk about a series of actions the Foundation has recently taken to protect communities across the globe.
我是维基媒体基金会的社群弹性与可持续发展副主席麦吉·丹尼斯。我今天想就基金会最近为保护全球社群的基金会行动向你们做出解释。
I apologize in advance for the length and the ambiguity in certain areas. These are complicated issues, and I will try to summarize a lot of what may be unfamiliar information to some of you succinctly. I will answer questions to the best of my ability within safety parameters, and I will be hosting an office hour in a few weeks where I can discuss these issues in more depth. We’re currently getting that set up in regards to availability of support staff and will announce it on Wikimedia-L and Meta as soon as that information is prepared.
首先请原谅我在接下来的某些段落中使用冗长且模糊的用词——这些问题非常复杂,而我将尽可能把这些问题用简洁的语言将这些可能你们不太熟悉的信息总结起来。我会尽可能在安全范围内向你们回答问题并将在接下来几周内举办一个可以让我们更深入讨论这些问题的办公室说明会。我们现在正在努力协调我们工作人员的空闲时间并将在一切准备妥当之后在元维基和Wikimedia-L邮件列表中公布有关细节。
Many of you are already aware of recent changes that the Foundation has made to its NDA policy. These changes have been discussed on Meta, and I won’t reiterate all of our disclosures there,[2] but I will briefly summarize that due to credible information of threat, the Foundation has modified its approach to accepting “non-disclosure agreements” from individuals. The security risk relates to information about infiltration of Wikimedia systems, including positions with access to personally identifiable information and elected bodies of influence. We could not pre-announce this action, even to our most trusted community partner groups (like the stewards), without fear of triggering the risk to which we’d been alerted. We restricted access to these tools immediately in the jurisdictions of concern, while working with impacted users to determine if the risk applied to them.
许多人可能都知道,基金会最近更改了我们的保密政策。关于这个改动,元维基已经有了很多讨论,而我也不在这里详细说明了。[3]不过我在这里简单总结一下,就是由于可能的安全隐患,基金会更改了关于接受个人与基金会签订“保密协议”的政策。这个安全隐患主要是关于对可以获得个人信息的人士和经过选举当选的管理人员的渗透。我们在更改这个政策之前,对即使是我们最信任的社群伙伴(比如监管员)都是保密的。因为我们害怕打草惊蛇。在做出政策改动之后,我们立即限制了在可能受到影响的地区对这些管理工具的访问,并和受到影响的人士合作来确定这些安全隐患是否影响到他们。
I want to pause to emphasize that we do not mean to accuse any specific individual whose access was restricted by that policy change of bad intent. Infiltration can occur through multiple mechanisms. What we have seen in our own movement includes not only people deliberately seeking to ingratiate themselves with their communities in order to obtain access and advance an agenda contrary to open knowledge goals, but also individuals who have become vulnerable to exploitation and harm by external groups because they are already trusted insiders. This policy primarily served to address the latter risk, to reduce the likelihood of recruitment or (worse) extortion. We believe that some of the individuals impacted by this policy change were also themselves in danger, not only the people whose personal information they could have been forced to access.
在这里我解释一下:我们并不是在指控受到这个政策影响的人士有坏的目的——(对维基项目的)渗透可以有很多方式。在我们的维基计划里,我们不仅看到了通过主动把自己融入到社群中来达成自己与我们“使知识变得更加开放”的目的相悖的人士,我们也见到了因为自己在社群内部受信任的“自己人”地位而变得容易被其他外部组织利用或上伤害的人士。这个政策的变更主要是为了防范后者。防范可能的对这些人士的招募甚至(更坏的)勒索。我们相信,不仅这些人士可以被迫访问的个人信息,这些人士自己也受到了威胁。
Today, the Foundation has rolled out a second phase of addressing infiltration concerns, which has resulted in sweeping actions in one of the two currently affected jurisdictions. We have banned seven users and desysopped a further 12 as a result of long and deep investigations into activities around some members of the unrecognized group Wikimedians of Mainland China.[4] We have also reached out to a number of other editors with explanations around canvassing guidelines and doxing policies and requests to modify their behaviors.
今天,基金会进行了防范这种渗透隐患的第二步:我们快速进行了针对现在受到影响的两个地区[5]其中之一的基金会行动。作为针对非官方承认的中国大陆维基用户组的某些成员的行为的调查的回应,我们全域禁制了七位用户并管理员除权了另外12位用户。我们也向其他许多用户进行了沟通,解释了关于拉票和“人肉搜索”[6]的有关政策并请求他们以后更改自己的行为。
When it comes to office actions, the Wikimedia Foundation typically defaults to little public communication, but this case is unprecedented in scope and nature. While there remain limits to what we can reveal in order to protect the safety and privacy of users in that country and in that unrecognized group, I want to acknowledge that this action is a radical one and that this decision was not easily made. We struggled with not wanting to discourage and destroy the efforts of good faith users in China who have worked so hard to fight for free and open knowledge, including some of those involved in this group. We do not want them to fear that their contributions are unwelcome. We also could not risk exposing them to danger by doing nothing to protect them after we became aware of credible threats to their safety.
一般来说,对于基金会行动,维基媒体基金会甚少公开进行沟通,但是这次情况是之前从没有过的,不论是从事件本身还是影响范围上。虽然为了保障这个国家[7]以及这个用户组用户的安全和隐私我们能披露什么仍然受到限制,但是我知道这个行动本身非常激进并且这个决定也不是轻易做出的。我们努力希望不去打消中国用户为了自由和开放知识的积极性和所做的努力,包括很多这个用户组的成员。我们不希望他们害怕自己的贡献是不受欢迎的。但我们也不能在知道确实的危险之后什么都不做,让他们承担受到危险的风险。
While some time ago we limited the exposure of personal information to users in mainland China, we know that there has been the kind of infiltration we describe above in the project. And we know that some users have been physically harmed as a result. With this confirmed, we have no choice but to act swiftly and appropriately in response.
当之前我们尝试限制向中国大陆人士披露个人信息[8]的时候,我们已经知道项目[9]内存在如上所述的渗透了,并且我们也知道一些用户因此受到了身体上的伤害。在确定这些信息后,我们别无选择,只能快速地作出应有的回应。
I take it as both a triumph and a challenge that in the years of my own involvement I have seen Wikimedia go from a suspect non-mainstream website to a highly trusted and widely relied upon source across the world. When I first started editing the projects in about 2007, I already believed Wikimedia had the capacity to be one of the greatest achievements of the world--collective knowledge, at your fingertips. What an amazing gesture of goodwill on the part of all of its many editors. It didn’t take me long after I started editing to realize how entrenched the battles could be over how to present information and how that can be exploited to achieve specific ends. I’m not trying to suggest that I was astonishingly prescient; I think there were many who realized that risk long before I stumbled naively on the scene. I do think that the risk is greater than ever now, when Wikimedia projects are widely trusted, and when the stakes are so high for organized efforts to control the information they share.
过去几年里,我个人在维基百科的活动有喜悦也有挑战。我见证了维基百科从一个可疑的非主流网站成为一个在世界上都非常可信的且被广泛依赖的涞源。当我在2007年第一次开始编辑维基项目的时候,我就已经相信维基百科有能力成为世界上最伟大的成就之一——只要动动手指就可以大家一起获取知识。这些编者们的善意真的是太棒了。但我在开始编辑后也很快意识到关于如何表述知识以及如何通过不同表述知识的方式来达成某些目的的战争是根深蒂固的。我不是在尝试说我自己的见解多么高明——我认为很多人在我无知地进入这种争论之前就已经意识到这一点风险了,而我认为现在这个风险,在维基媒体项目被广泛相信的时候,在有组织地控制信息能得到的好处比以前更高的时候,比以往更加严重。
Community “capture” is a real and present threat. For years, the movement has been widely aware of challenges in the Croatian Wikipedia, with documentation going back nearly a decade. The Foundation recently set up a disinformation team, which is still finding its footing and assessing the problem, but which began by contracting an external researcher to review that project and the challenges and help us understand potential causes and solutions for such situations.[10] We have also recently staffed a human rights team to deal with urgent threats to the human rights of communities across the group as a result of such organized efforts to control information. The situation we are dealing with today has shown me how much we need as a movement to grapple with the hard questions of how we remain open to editing by anyone, anywhere, while ensuring that individuals who take us up on that offer are not harmed by those who want to silence them.
社群“劫持”是一个确实且现今存在的威胁。过去几年来,我们的运动都知道克罗地亚语维基百科所面临的问题[11],而关于这个问题的记载近乎有10年。基金会最近建立了反假信息团队。虽然这个团队仍然在寻找立足点并评估问题,但这个团队已经雇佣[12]一位外部研究者来评估这个项目和它所面临的挑战,并帮我们更好地理解这类问题可能的原因和解决方法。我们也最近雇用了一个人权组织来解决因为由如上的有组织的信息控制尝试而造成的对社群人权的威胁。我们今天所面临的问题正揭示了我们作为一个运动需要什么样的努力才能保证我们保持对在所有地方的所有人都开放,且保证参与我们计划的个人不会因此被那些希望他们噤声的人士或者组织伤害到。
With respect to the desysopping, we hope to connect with the international Chinese language community in the near future to talk about approaches to elections that avoid the risk of project capture and ensure that people are and feel safe contributing to the Chinese language Wikipedia. We need to make sure that the community can hold fair elections, without canvassing or fraud. We hope that helping to establish such a fair approach to elections will allow us to reinstate CheckUser rights in time.
关于管理员除权这点,我们希望和国际上的中文社群在不久的将来沟通并讨论有关我们关于选举的方法来防止我们的项目被“劫持”,同时保证编者们在编辑中文维基百科的时候确实是也感觉到安全。我们需要保障社群能在不被拉票的情况下进行公正的选举。我们也希望能帮助建立一个公平的方法来允许我们在一定时间内重新恢复用户核查权限。
I want to close this message by noting that I am personally deeply sorry to those of you for whom this will be a shock. This will undoubtedly include those who wonder if they should fear that their personal information has been exposed (we do not believe so; we believe we acted in time to prevent that) and also those who fear that further such bold action is in the works which may disrupt them and their work and their communities (at this point, with this action, we believe the identified risks have been contained in the short to medium term). I am also truly sorry to those communities who have been uneasy in the shadow of such threats for some time. The Foundation continues to build our capacity to support every community that wants or needs its support - and we are still learning how to do so well when we do. One of the key areas we seek improvement is in our ability to understand our human rights impact and in our ability to address those challenges. You have not had the service you’ve deserved. We can’t fix things immediately, but we are working to improve, actively, intentionally, and with focus.
在这篇文章的最后,我希望说我对这次行动可能惊吓到的人士表示深刻的,发自内心的道歉。这个毋庸置疑包括那些害怕自己的个人信息可能会被泄露的人士(我们不认为如此,我们认为我们的行为足够快来防止这种事情的发生)和那些害怕其他像这样激进的基金会行动已经在计划之中了,而害怕他们的工作和社群被影响的人士(现在来说,我们认为随着这个基金会行动我们已经在中短期内把我们发现的隐患遏制了)。我也对我们受到这个威胁阴影下一段时间的社群表达非常抱歉。基金会会继续增长我们的能力,来支持任何需要或者希望被支持的社群,虽然我们仍在学习如何在这样做的时候做得最好。我们需要提升的地方之一就是我们理解对人权的影响并解决这些挑战的能力。你们并没有获得你们应得的服务。我们并不能立刻修复问题,但是我们在努力,主动,带有认知和专注地提升。
To the 4,000 active Chinese language Wikimedians distributed across the world and serving readers in multiple continents,[13][14] I would like to communicate my sorrow and regret. I want to assure you that we will do better. The work you do in sharing knowledge to Chinese readers everywhere has great meaning, and we are committed to supporting you in doing this work into the future, with the tools you need to succeed in a safe, secure, and productive environment.
对那些4000个活跃的,生活在世界各地和各大洲的,为读者服务的中文维基人们,我想向你们传达我的悲伤和遗憾。我向你们保证我们会做得更好。你们现在所做的,为中文读者共享知识的行为有崇高的意义,而我们也将会坚定地支持你们在未来继续这项工作,并提供工具来保障一个安全和有生产力的环境。
Again, I will answer what questions I can, also relying on the support of others in Legal and perhaps beyond. We’re setting up a page on Meta to talk, and I will be hosting an office hour in coming weeks.
最后,我还是要重复一遍,我会尽我所能回答你们的问题,在其他法务部成员和其他人的支持下。我们将会在元维基上设置一个页面来讨论,我也将会在接下来几周举行一个办公室说明会。
Best regards,
祝一切都好,
Maggie Dennis (WMF) (talk) 16:13, 13 September 2021 (UTC) Maggie</translate>
- ^ [[<tvar|CRS>:m:Community_Resilience_and_Sustainability</>|Community Resilience and Sustainability]]
- ^ [[<tvar|pol>:m:Talk:Access_to_nonpublic_personal_data_policy#Policy_adjustment_on_behalf_of_Legal</>]]
- ^ 译注:指除申请并获得豁免外,禁止在封锁维基百科的地区居住且其他人也知道其在封锁维基百科的地区居住的人士以志愿者身份获得保密信息的改动。
- ^ [[<tvar|wmc>:m:Wikimedians_of_Mainland_China</>]]
- ^ 译注:应该是指现阶段封锁维基百科的地区
- ^ 译注:抱歉关于doxing不太确定更好的翻译是什么
- ^ 译注:应该指中国大陆
- ^ 译注:应该是指之前撤销ZHWP所有CU权限的基金会行动
- ^ 译注:应该指ZHWP
- ^ m:Croatian_Wikipedia_Disinformation_Assessment-2021
- ^ 译注:根据基金会的官方报告,指克罗地亚语维基百科管理人员利用自己地位选择性执行方针排除异己并输入大量带有偏见的极右派民族主义信息的问题
- ^ 译注:这里的contract一词更多指的是作为临时员工或者合同工而非永久雇员
- ^ <tvar|stats>https://stats.wikimedia.org/#/zh.wikipedia.org</>
- ^ <tvar|stats2>https://stats.wikimedia.org/#/zh.wikipedia.org/reading/page-views-by-country/normal%7Cmap%7Clast-month%7C(access)~desktop*mobile-app*mobile-web%7Cmonthly</>