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About me
編輯參與編撰的條目
編輯哲學
編輯歷史
編輯遷徙新大陸模型--04/2013（進度10%）
生態學
編輯Character
編輯
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早期思想
編輯As a philosopher with a mathematical background, Husserl was interested in developing a general theory of inferential systems, which (following Bolzano) he conceived of as a theory of science, on the ground that every science (including mathematics) can be looked upon as a system of propositions that are interconnected by a set of inferential relations. Following John S. Mill, he argues in Logical Investigations that the best way to study the nature of such propositional systems is to start with their linguistic manifestations, i.e., (sets of) sentences and (assertive) utterances thereof. 胡塞爾早年研究致力於數理哲學和科學哲學。 胡塞爾的理論指出，所有科學，包括數學可以被看作是一個推論系統，其中所有的命題都互為推演關係。在《邏輯研究》當中，胡塞爾認為研究這種推論系統最好的方法是從他們語言的表徵開始。
那 麼，如何分析這些句子和命題的語言表徵呢? 胡塞爾的方法是首先從開始意識單位着手，也就是說，所有的命題應該被以話語者演講的方式被表現出來，話語者在其中論述以及回答所提及的問題，就好像話語者 在上給學生上課。這些意識單位被胡塞爾認為是刻意行為或者刻意經驗，因為他們總是代表了一些希望被展示出來的一面。而一個命題中總是有刻意的和非刻意的意 識單位。刻意意識之所以是刻意意識是因為它包含刻意的組成部分而非刻意的意識卻沒有。
甚至看無對象的刻意經驗（例如「空」）也和思維中天馬行空一樣帶有刻意成分。在胡塞爾看來，思維是缺乏對應對象的，而刻意行為就是把思維和對象以「僅僅好像是那個對象」連結起來，而不是確實是那個對象。胡塞爾反對認為，這些刻意經驗只是思維內部表徵外部對象的圖樣。
Even objectless (i.e., empty) intentional experiences like your thought of the winged horse Pegasus have content. On Husserl's view, that thought simply lacks a corresponding object; the intentional act is 「merely as of」, but not really of, an object. Husserl rejects 「representationalist」 accounts of intentionality, such as the mental image theory, according to which intentional experiences represent intra-mental pictorial representations of objects, where like other pictures such images may exist without there being a depicted object in the actual world. For Husserl, this view leads to a 「false duplication」 of objects represented in the veridical case; and it already presupposes what an adequate conception of pictorial representation is yet to accomplish: an explanation of what it is that makes the underlying 「phantasy content」, or phantasm, 「the [r]epresenting image of something or other」 (Husserl 1994, p. 347; Husserliana, vol. XXII, pp. 305f). It is precisely an intentional content that does the trick here (as in all cases of intentional consciousness), according to Husserl, in a way to be explained in more detail by his phenomenology of consciousness.
In the case of propositional acts, i.e., units of consciousness that can be given voice to by a complete sentence, Husserl identifies their content with the propositional meaning expressed by that sentence. In the case of their non-propositional but still intentional parts, he identifies the corresponding intentional content with a sub-propositional meaning. For example, the judgement 「Napoleon is a Frenchman」 contains an act of thinking of Napoleon whose intentional content is the sub-propositional meaning expressed by the name 「Napoleon」. (Accordingly, the judgement can be looked upon as an act of ascribing the property of being French to the referent of that name.) Experiences like this, which can be given voice to by either a singular or a general term, are called 「nominal acts」 (as opposed to the propositional acts containing them). Their contents are called 「nominal meanings」.
Husserl regards both propositional and nominal meanings as the subject-matter of 「pure logic」 or 「logic in the wide sense」—the study of (i) what distinguishes sense (alias meaning) from nonsense (this part of pure logic being called 「pure grammar」) and (ii) which of the senses delivered by pure grammar are logically consistent and which of them are not (this part of pure logic being labelled 「logic in the narrow sense」).
An important and still largely unexplored claim of Husserl's is that any logically consistent meaning can in principle be subjectively fulfilled, more or less adequately, by a unified intuition, such as an act of continuous perception or intuitive imagination, where the structure and other essential features of the meaning in question can be read off from the respective mode of intuitive fulfillment. Inconsistent meanings can be singled out and studied by means of (reflection upon) corresponding experiences of intuitive conflict, like for instance the discrete switching back and forth between a duck-head-imagination and a rabbit-head-imagination in the case of an attempted intuitive imagination of a duck-head that is at the same time a rabbit-head. Some meanings are inconsistent for formal-logical reasons. According to Husserl, all analytically false propositions belong to this category. Other meanings are inconsistent because they conflict with some general material a priori truth, also called 「essential law」. The proposition expressed by the sentence 「There are perceptual objects whose surface is both (visibly) completely green and completely red at the same time」 is a case in point.
Meanings generally and propositions in particular exist independently of their actually functioning as intentional content. Thus, true propositions such as the Pythagorean theorem can be discovered. Propositions and their components are abstract, i.e., atemporal, objects. However, what does it mean to grasp a proposition or, more generally, a sense? How can an abstract object become the content of an intentional act? Combining ideas of Bolzano and Lotze, Husserl answers this question by taking recourse to the notion of an ideal (i.e., abstract) species or type, as follows. Propositions and other meanings are ideal species that can be (but do not have to be) instantiated by certain particular features, i.e., dependent parts, of intentional acts. Those species are also called 「ideal matters」. The particular features instantiating an ideal matter—Husserl refers to them as 「moments of matter」—are laid bare by phenomenological description, a reflection-based (or introspective) analysis taking into account both the linguistic expression(s) (if any) and the modes of (possible) intuitive fulfillment or conflict associated with the respective experience.
Since phenomenological description yields ideal species, it involves what Husserl was later (notably in Ideas) to call 「eidetic reduction」, i.e., an unfolding of abstract features shared by appropriate sets of fictitious or real-life examples, by way, e.g., of free imaginative variation on an arbitrarily chosen initial example (for the method of 「free variation」, see Experience and Judgement, sec. 87).
Phenomenological description also yields the 「moment of quality」 of the intentional experience under investigation, i.e., the particular feature instantiating its psychological mode (judgement, conscious deliberation, conscious desire, conscious hope, etc.), which roughly corresponds to the speech act mode of an utterance giving voice to that experience. Furthermore, the description yields relations of 「foundation」, i.e., one-sided or mutual relative existential dependencies between (1) the experience in question and other experiences and (2) the particular descriptive features of the experience. Thus, an experience of pleasure about a given event is one-sidedly founded, relative to the stream of consciousness it belongs to, in a particular belief-state to the effect that this event has occurred. (The relativization to a particular stream of consciousness makes sure that both founded and founding experience occur in the same person's mind.) Like all foundation relations, this one holds in virtue of an essential law, to the effect that conscious pleasure about some state of affairs requires a corresponding (and simultaneous) belief. Quite generally, a given object a of type F is founded in a particular object b of type G (where a is different from b and F is different from G) relative to a particular whole c of type H if and only if (i) there is an essential law in virtue of which it holds that for any object x of type F there is an object y of type G and a whole z of type H, such that both x and y are (proper) parts of z, and (ii) both a and b are (proper) parts of c. Of course, the notion of an essential law needs further clarification.