維基百科

使用者:Riskchard/TextPage6

< User:Riskchard

The use–mention distinction is a foundational concept of analytic philosophy,[1] according to which it is necessary to make a distinction between using a word (or phrase) and mentioning it,[2][3] and many philosophical works have been "vitiated by a failure to distinguish use and mention".[2] The distinction is disputed by non-analytic philosophers.[4]

The distinction between use and mention can be illustrated for the word cheese:[2][3]

Use
Cheese is derived from milk.
Mention
"Cheese" is derived from the Old English word "cyse".

The first sentence is a statement about the substance called cheese; it uses the word "cheese" to refer to that substance. The second is a statement about the word cheese as a signifier; it mentions the word without using it to refer to anything other than itself.

Grammar

編輯

In written language, mentioned words or phrases often appear between quotation marks ("Chicago" contains three vowels) or in italics (When I say honey, I mean the sweet stuff that bees make), and style authorities such as Strunk and White insist that mentioned words or phrases must always be made visually distinct in this manner. Used words or phrases (much more common than mentioned ones) do not bear any typographic distinction. Prefixing a term with the phrase "so-called" can also be used to convey a use–mention distinction. In the absence of the use of such cues, the audience must identify mentioned words or phrases through semantic and pragmatic cues.[5]

If quotation marks are used, it is sometimes the practice to distinguish between the quotation marks used for speech and those used for mentioned words, with double quotes in one place and single in the other:

  • When Larry said, "That has three letters," he was referring to the word 'bee'.
  • With reference to "bumbershoot", Peter explained that 'The term refers to an umbrella.'

Many authorities recommend against such a distinction, and prefer one style of quotation mark to be used for both purposes,[6] which is a much more common practice.

Use–mention in philosophy

編輯

The general phenomenon of a term's having different references in different contexts was called suppositio (substitution) by medieval logicians.[7] It describes how one has to substitute a term in a sentence based on its meaning—that is, based on the term's referent. In general, a term can be used in several ways. For nouns, they are:

  • Properly with a real referent: "That is my cow" (assuming it exists). (personal supposition)
  • Properly with a generic referent: "Any cow gives milk." (simple supposition)
  • Properly but with a non-real referent: "Santa Claus's cow is very big."
  • Improperly by way of metaphor: "Your sister is a cow". (improper supposition)
  • As a pure term: "Cow has only three letters". (material supposition)

The last sentence contains a mention example.

The use–mention distinction is especially important in analytic philosophy.[8] Failure to properly distinguish use from mention can produce false, misleading, or meaningless statements or category errors. For example, the following correctly distinguish between use and mention:

  • Copper contains six letters, and is not a metal.
  • Copper is a metal, and contains no letters.

Stanisław Leśniewski was perhaps the first to make widespread use of this distinction or fallacy, seeing it all around in analytic philosophy of the time, for example in Russell's Principia Mathematica;[9] at the logical level, a use–mention mistake occurs when two heterogeneous levels of meaning or context are confused inadvertently.[來源請求]

Donald Davidson told that in his student years, "quotation was usually introduced as a somewhat shady device, and the introduction was accompanied by a stern sermon on the sin of confusing the use and mention of expressions". He presented a class of sentences like

  • Quine said that "quotation has a certain anomalous feature."

which both use the meaning of the quoted words to complete the sentence, and mention them as they are attributed to W. V. Quine, to argue against his teachers' hard distinction. His claim was that quotations could not be analyzed as simple expressions that mention their content by means of naming it or describing its parts, as sentences like the above would lose their exact, twofold meaning.[10]

Self-referential statements mention themselves or their components, often producing logical paradoxes, such as Quine's paradox. A mathematical analogy of self-referential statements lies at the core of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem.[來源請求] There are many examples of self-reference and use–mention distinction in the works of Douglas Hofstadter, who makes the distinction thus:

When a word is used to refer to something, it is said to be being used. When a word is quoted, though, so that someone is examining it for its surface aspects (typographical, phonetic, etc.), it is said to be being mentioned.[11]

Although the standard notation for mentioning a term in philosophy and logic is to put the term in quotation marks, issues arise when the mention is itself of a mention. Notating using italics might require a potentially infinite number of typefaces, while putting quotation marks within quotation marks may lead to ambiguity.[12]

Some analytic philosophers have said the distinction "may seem rather pedantic".[2]

In a 1977 response to analytic philosopher John Searle, Jacques Derrida mentioned the distinction as "rather laborious and problematical".[4]

See also

編輯

Notes

編輯
  1. ^ Wheeler (2005) p. 568
  2. ^ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Devitt and Sterelny (1999) pp. 40-1
  3. ^ 3.0 3.1 W.V. Quine (1940) p. 24
  4. ^ 4.0 4.1 Derrida (1977) p.79
  5. ^ Wilson, Shomir. A Computational Theory of the Use-Mention Distinction in Natural Language. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland. 2011 [16 February 2013]. 
  6. ^ For example, Butcher's Copy-Editing: the Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders. 4th edition, by Judith Butcher, Caroline Drake and Maureen Leach. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Butcher's recommends against the practice, but The Chicago Manual of Style, section 7.58 (15th edition, 2003), indicates that "philosophers" use single quotes for a practice akin to the use/mention distinction, though it is not explained in this way.
  7. ^ See Read, Stephen (2006). Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. ^ Quotation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 16 July 2005 [5 October 2009]. 
  9. ^ Simons, Peter. Leśniewski, Stanisław. Borchert, Donald M (編). Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition e-book. Thomson Gale. 2006: 292. ISBN 0-02-866072-2. 
  10. ^ Davidson, Donald. Quotation. Theory and Decision. 1979-03, 11 (1): 27–40 [8 December 2010]. ISSN 0040-5833. doi:10.1007/BF00126690. 
  11. ^ Hofstadter, Douglas R. Metamagical Themas. 1985: 9. 
  12. ^ Boolos, George. Logic, Logic, and Logic. 1999: 398.  In this 1995 paper, Boolos discussed ambiguities in using quotation marks as part of a formal language, and proposed a way of distinguishing levels of mentioning using a finite number of marks, using "′" to modify the succeeding "°", as in:
    According to W. Quine,
    Whose views on quotation are fine,
    °Boston° names Boston,
    and ′°°Boston°′° names °Boston°,
    But 9 doesn't designate 9.

References

編輯

Further reading

編輯
編輯
取自「https://zh.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Riskchard/TextPage6&oldid=28110034」